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Article 8

Case Comment
FONTHILL LUMBER LTD. v. BANK OF MONTREAL-SECTION 3 MECHANICS LIEN ACT (ONT.)-TRUST FUND-DEPOSIT BY CONTRACTOR TO

OVERDRAWN ACCOUNT - KNOWLEDGE OF BANK MANAGER. In 1942
the Ontario Mechanics' Lien Act1 was amended to add the present
section 3 which creates a trust fund in favour of materialmen and
workmen of all sums received by a builder, contractor or subcontractor
on account of the contract prices. In 1948 a similar amendment
2
was made to the Mechanics' Lien Act of British Columbia.

Despite the extensive building programme in Canada, there have
been relatively few reported decisions on this section. The reported
cases fall into two main categories - viz., those dealing with an
assignment of book debts by the contractor to the bank and those
dealing with deposits to a general checking account (usually overdrawn). The first category is exemplified by such cases as Bank of
Montreal v. Sidney3 and the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Minneapolis-Honeywel Regulator Co. v. Empire Brass Mfg. Co. 4 The
present comment will be confined to a discussion of the recent cases
dealing with the second category and in particular, with the decision
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Fonthill Lumber Ltd. v. Bank of

Montreal5

Since the Fonthill Lumber case has already been distinguished
on the facts in two recent decisions, a careful examination of those
facts is imperative.
A, a contractor, required funds to carry on his business and was
granted an overdraft of $5000. in August, 1955, the security being
the personal guarantee of his wife. On November 1, 1956 the overdraft amounted to $8796 and the bank manager began to press for
payment. A, having been given a cheque for $1600. on account of a
contract, deposited this amount on November 16. Between November
19 and 22 six cheques were dishonoured. This pressure succeeded, for
on November 23 A deposited $7899. being cheques and cash paid to
I Statute Amendment Act, 1942 (Ont.), c. 34, s. 21. See now R.S.O.
1960, c. 233.
2 R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 205. See now R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 238.
3 [1955] O.W.N. 581; 4 D.L.R. 87 which was considered in Dominion
Bank v. FasselZ and Baglier Construction Co., [1955] O.W.N. 709, and dis.
tinguished in Niagara Concrete Pipe Ltd. v. Charles Stewart Ltd., [1956]
O.W.N. 769.
4 [1955] S.C.R. 694; 3 D.L.R. 561 reversing (1954), 13 W.W.R. (NS) 449.
This case has been followed in Evans Coleman and Evans Ltd. v. Nelson
Construction Co. (1958), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 218: 25 W.W.R. 569 and approved in
Scott v. Riehl (1959), 15 D.L.R. (2d) 67; (1958), 25 W.W.R. 525. An interesting comment on the Bank of Montreal v. Sydney and the Minneapolis.Honey.
well cases written by H. Maxwell Bruce Q.C., co-author of a Handbook of
Canadian Mechanics' Liens (Toronto, Carswell Co. 1956), may be found In
(1956), 34 Can. Bar Rev. 855.
5 [1959] O.R. 451; (1959), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 746 (trial); (1959), 19 D.L.R.
(2d) 618 (C.A.); (1959), 38 Can. Bcy. R. 68.
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him by persons for whom he was building houses. After the manager
would not succumb to the insistence of Mr. A to allow Mrs. A to
withdraw her guarantee, Mrs. A gave notice of such withdrawal. At
the same time A informed the manager not to cash any future cheque
which would result in his account being overdrawn. Accordingly,
several cheques to cover payment for wages and supplies were dishonoured. After his proposal to his creditors was refused, A made an
assignment in bankruptcy on December 12, 1956.
A supplier, the Fonthill Lumber Co., instituted an action against
the bank to test the propriety of the bank applying the funds against
the overdraft-especially the deposit on November 23. On having its
action dismissed by Stewart J., the plaintiff advanced three grounds
of appeal.
The first ground was that section 3 created a statutory trust
which remained in full force as long as there were unpaid workmen
and materialmen. Hence A had no title to the fund and could not
transfer title to the bank. Notice of the trust character of the fund
by the bank was therefore immaterial. The appellant thus tried to
apply the principles of the Minneapolis-Honeywell decision by analogy. However, the Court of Appeal, after finding no assignment in
fact, stated that "the principle applicable to an assignment of such
funds would not operate to prevent the depositor from conferring
title upon the banks to the moneys deposited by him in the ordinary
course of banking".6 It is submitted that this line is the key to the
decision of this and subsequent cases. The question of fact becomes
simply, what is the ordinary course of banking and has this course
been followed in these circumstances?
The appellant then argued that the bank manager was aware of
the money and was under a duty to make proper inquiries to ascertain if there were outstanding accounts for work and material. It
was apparent from the evidence that the manager knew that the
money had come from persons for whom A was building houses. The
argument as to the duty of the manager was not fully canvassed by
the Court of Appeal in its decision, but was dealt with recently by
Smily J. in Standard Electric Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada7 where
he stated that such an onerous duty could become ludicrous if each
deposit would have to be minutely scrutinized.
In conclusion it was argued that, in any event, the bank manager
had actual knowledge that the moneys were trust funds, knew of A's
financial difficulties, and knew that A was not entitled to divert those
moneys to his private use or for the benefit of his wife (i.e. since
she was the guarantor of the overdraft). On the question of the
knowledge of the manager, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the
trial judge. Stewart J. had stated:8
6 [1959) O.R. at p. 465. Italics mine.
7 [1960] O.W.N. 367; (1960), 24 D.L.R. (2d) 467.
8 [1959] O.R. 451 at 456; (1959), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 746 at 747.
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"Mr. Partington states, and I accept his evidence that he did not know
whether or not Anger owed for labour or materials or whether he could
meet his obligations to his suppliers. He states that he did not either
know or suspect that he was in any financial difficulties, but, in view
of the fact that he had considerable difficulty in getting Anger to reduce the amount of his overdraft, I have some hesitancy in accepting
this last statement".

Stewart J. then found that the plaintiff had not shown that the defendant was aware of the trust and was therefore not a party to the
breach of trust. The Court of Appeal, speaking through Schroeder
J.A., could not agree with these findings, stating that the Court below
must have "overlooked" the evidence of the cheques for materials and
wages which were dishonoured. The Court of Appeal went on to find
that the manager knew the source of these moneys, realized that A
was financially embarrassed and that there were unpaid accounts
and, since he must be taken to have known the provisions of section
3 of the Mechanics' Lien Act, he must have known that the moneys
were a trust fund. 9 Applying the law to the fact so found, the Court
held that the bank was under a "transmitted fiduciary obligation" to
account to the beneficiaries (unpaid workmen and materialmen) of
the trust, following the leading case of John v. Dodwell and Co.10
The manager knowingly participated in the breach of trust. The fact
that there was a personal benefit to the bank, although not necessarily proof of privity to the breach of trust, was considered as strong
evidence of such.-1 Hence the money received by the bank in such
circumstances is to be held on a constructive trust for all unpaid
workmen and suppliers of the bankrupt contractor.
The findings in this case may be brought into a sharper relief if
shortly contrasted with the two recent Ontario cases which distinguished it. In John M. Troup Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada,12 Wells
J. found that the deposit on the facts "was made in what appears to
have been the ordinary course of business by the construction company".13 There was no evidence of knowledge by the bank of the
accounts of the materialmen as was found in the FonthillLumber case.
Moreover, the deposit in question was made during a time when the
account balance was actively fluctuating. Hence, the action was dismissed.
The same result was reached on similar facts in StandardElectric
Co. Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada.'4 Smily J. obviously had the Fonthill Lumber decision in mind when he found that the money "was
9
Thus distinguishing Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank Ltd., [1893] A.C.
282 on the facts.
10 [1948] A.C. 563. See generally, Baxter, The Law of Banking, (Toronto, Carswell Co. Ltd., 1956), pp. 298-303.
11 On this point the court cited Gray v. Johnston (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 1.
12 [1960] O.W.N. 350; (1960), 24 D.L.R. (2d) 460. This case is also interesting in that there was also an assignment of book debts. However, it was
never relied upon or used and it was held that the deposit was paid in virtue
of the assignment-thus closing the door to a possible Minneapolis.Honey.
well line of argument.
23 rbid. at p. 351 O.W.N.; p. 464 D.L.R.
14 [1960] O.W.N. 367; (1960), 24 D.L.R. (2d) 467.
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deposited in a general way in the ordinary course of business. It
was not the result of any pressure by the bank, for there was no concern at that time on the part of the bank with respect to the financial
condition of the contractor". 15 Hence on the facts the manager was
not aware of either the financial difficulties, the breach of trust of
the contractor, or the origin of the moneys deposited.
This result is, of course, in line with the situation envisaged in
section 96 (1) of the Bank Act' 6 which states that, "The Bank is not
bound to see to the execution of any trust, whether express, implied
or constructive, to which any deposit made under the authority of
this Act is subject". This section had been pleaded as a defence in the
Fonthill Lumber case but Schroeder J.A. held that this section would
not operate so as to release a bank from liability if it knew, not
merely of the existence of the trust, but also of the commission of a
breach of trust, or of unusual circumstances which should have put
it on inquiry. Thus section 96 (1) apparently leaves the common law
unaltered.' 7
The Court of Appeal also decided that section 3 of the Mechanics'
Lien Act was within the legislative competence of the provincial legislature and that the bank was bound by all existing laws of the province. It appears inherent in the judgment that section 3, while it
"affects" banks and banking, was not passed "in relation to" banking' s but was rather legislation in relation to contracts within the
province. 19
Thus the legislative desire to protect workmen and materialmen
from impecunious contractors has been implemented in the main. It
is clear from the Minneapolis-Honeywell decision that an assignment
of book debts is not a sufficient security for a bank to accept if
it is to be completely protected. It is submitted, however, that a bank
may grant an overdraft and accept deposits against it unless in fact
it has been a party to a subsequent breach of trust by either instigating it or knowingly acquiescing in it. Pressing for payment of an
overdraft is surely "in the ordinary course" of banking but it is clear
that pressure to such an extent as to knowingly force a customer to
breach his fiduciary obligations is not. Due to the constrictions of the
doctrine of stare decisis the Courts will doubtless refuse to define
the precise line of demarcation at which such pressure will necessitate knowledge of the breach of trust. This is basically a problem for
the practitioner rather than the theorist and as such will doubtless
be more fully litigated.
It is further suggested that events have proved that the prediction of one commentator following the Ontario Court of Appeal
15 Ibid, at p. 368 O.W.N., p. 469 D.L.R.
16 1953-54, 2 & 3, Eliz. II.

17 This view is in accord wvith that of Prof. I. F. G. Baxter at p. 355 of The
Law1of
8 Banking, suprafootnote 12.
Bank of Toronto 'v. Lambe (1887), 12 A.C. 574.
19 Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1882), 7 A.C. 96.
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decision in T. MoAvity & Sons v. Can. Bank of Commerce2 O that "if
the chartered banks are to continue the normal financing of the operations of contractors, then a speedy repeal of section 3 appears to be
indicated",2 1 was unduly apprehensive. The courts are aware that
there are conflicting interests between two relatively innocent parties and that the legislature has decided in its wisdom to protect the
interests of the party who has the least opportunity of protecting
himself. The chartered banks are surely in a better position to ascertain the present and future financial position of a contractor than is
a workman. Hence, while the banks may be more cautious in the
future in dealing with builders, it is improbable that they will refuse
to grant credit to members of a basic industry merely on the ground
22
that in some cases they may not have unimpeachable securities.
MERVIN BURGARDO

LA PIERRE V. WALTER-RECOGNrION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE DECRE,PREFERENCE FOR RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF SHAW V. GOULD- LIBERAL
APPROACH OF TRAVERS V. HOLLEY. The important conflict of laws
problem of the recognition of foreign decrees of divorce arose again

in the interesting case of La Pierrev. Walter,1 heard recently in the
Supreme Court of Alberta. There, Riley J. considered the problem2
fully; then he rejected emphatically the rule in Travers v. Holley
and adopted what appeared to him to be the orthodox approach as
declared in Shaw v. Gould3 and affirmed in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier.4 This comment is confined to brief discussion of the learned
judge's approach to the problem and the possible relevance his decision
may bear for an Ontario court.
The basic common law position was clearly laid down in Shaw v.
Gould, where the House of Lords held that the English courts would
recognize a foreign decree of divorce only if the parties were domiciled in the foreign country at the time of the divorce proceedings.
The Privy Council in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier reiterated the rule.
Lord Watson put it this way:
"A decree of divorce a vincuio, pronounced by a Court whose jurisdic.
tion is solely derived from some rule of municipal law peculiar to Its
forum, cannot, when it trenches upon the interests of any other country
to whose tribunals
the spouses were amenable, claim extra-territorial
authority". 5

This same rule also applied at common law in relation to the
assumption of jurisdiction in matters of divorce. Strictly speaking,
20 [1959] S.C.R. 478; (1959), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 153; (1959), 37 Can. Bcy. R.
1; affirming [1958] O.W.N. 324.
21 (1959), 37 Can. Bcy. R. 1 at 5.
22The author has not examined the economic problems created by sec.
tion 3, viz. the effect on the number of advances to contractors generally, to
the classes of contractors or the effect of a possible interest rate increase.
*Mr. Burgard is in the Third Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 (1960), 31 W.W.R. 26; 24 D.L.R. (2d) 483.
2 [1953] P. 246; [1953] 2 All E.R. 794 (C.A.).
3 (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 55.
4 [1895] A.C. 517. (P.C.).
5
Ibid at p. 528.

